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Abstract 
We explore in this paper the axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from bundled 
pricing. We formalize two models for this problem on the grounds of two different informational bases. 
In both models, we provide axiomatic rationale for natural rules to solve the problem. We, nonetheless, 
obtain drastic differences under each scenario, which highlights the importance of setting the 
appropriate informational basis of the problem. 
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1 Introduction
It is well known that bundling products may increase revenue with respect
to selling products independently (e.g., Adams and Yellen, 1976). Real-life
instances in which bundling occurs abound. Think, for instance, of season
tickets for art or sport shows at a given venue, unlimited streaming video
or music downloads through periodic charges from digital video merchants
or music sellers, or the transportation cards combining access to all the
transportation means (e.g., bus, subway, tram) in a given city.
Our running example in this paper will refer to the case of museum
passes, given their long tradition of use. In many cities (or, even, regions
and countries) worldwide, museums join to give visitors unlimited access
to their collections during a limited period of time. Passes are, obviously,
more expensive than the individual ticket of each participating museum on
the joint venture, but less expensive than the sum of all individual tickets.
The problem we deal with in here is that of deciding how to share the net
revenue from the sale of passes among the participating museums. Many
issues arise to address this problem from a fairness viewpoint. For instance,
is it fair to let more popular museums get a higher piece of the pie? Should
less popular museums face a hurdle to allow them be part of the pass? Do
we treat visits without the pass to the museums similarly to pass visits? We
plan to tackle these (and related) issues by exploring the axiomatic approach
to the problem, a somewhat unexplored approach in this case.1
We consider two somewhat related, albeit fundamentally different, mod-
els to address this problem. Each of them reflects a different informational
basis, depending on whether the identity of visitors using the pass is known
or not. More precisely, we assume, in each case, the existence of a group
of heterogeneous museums. Heterogeneity is measured by their entrance
prices, as well as by their number of visitors (with and without the pass).
The price of the pass and the number of pass holders is also known in each
case. Now, in the first model we assume that the actual subset of museums
visited by each holder of a (museum) pass is observed, and that piece of
information will play a role in the model; whereas in the second model the
identity of the pass holders visiting each museum is not known.
Our first model will then rely on a richer informational basis that makes
use of the identity of actual pass visitors to museums. This is more in
line with the seminal contribution on museum pass problems by Ginsburgh
1The reader is referred to Thomson (2001) for a hitchhiker’s guide of the axiomatic
method and some of its more popular applications to game theory and resource allocation.
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and Zang (2003). Nevertheless, our model will be more general to capture
additional aspects of the heterogeneity of museums (such that the number
of visitors without the pass each museum has, which could also be inter-
preted as a sign of the individual status of that museum). We provide
several characterization results for rules generalizing the canonical Shapley
rule, proposed by Ginsburgh and Zang (2003), to our setting. Among other
things, we provide axiomatic rationale for the rule that allocates the rev-
enue from each pass (among the museums visited by the user of such pass)
proportionally to the product of the entrance price and the number of visits
without the pass of the museums. The results rely on standard axioms such
as equal treatment of equals, dummy, additivity, or splitting-proofness.
Our second model relies on a less demanding informational basis in which
the identity of visitors using the pass is not known. Our first result in this
model highlights a fundamental difference with respect to the first model.
More precisely, we shall see how an impossibility result arises when combin-
ing three natural axioms (equal treatment of equals, dummy and additivity),
whereas many rules emerge in the first model. This raises the importance
of setting the appropriate informational basis of the problem.
The related literature to the problem we analyze in this work is scarce.2
As mentioned above, Ginsburgh and Zang (2003) could be considered the
seminal contribution addressing this problem. They take a game-theoretical
approach to the problem by proposing to associate it to a TU-game, which
they claim should be solved by means of the Shapley value associated to it.3
Their model is similar to the first model we consider in this paper, as they
include, for each pass holder, the subset of museums this pass holder actually
visits. They, however, do not consider other individual characteristics of mu-
seums, in contrast to what we do, such as entrance prices or visitors without
the pass. More recently, there have been some contributions approaching
the problem in a more similar way to what we do with our second model
(e.g., Este´vez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2012; Casas-Me´ndez et al., 2011). Neverthe-
less, those contributions approach the museum-pass problem as a specific
bankruptcy problem and endorse rules from the bankruptcy literature (e.g.,
O’Neill, 1982; Thomson, 2003) to solve museum-pass problems too, which
contrasts to what we do in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
2See, nevertheless, Casas-Me´ndez et al., (2014) for a recent survey.
3It turns out that the Shapley value can be easily computed in this context, thanks to
the decomposition principle. Based on it, Ginsburgh and Zang (2003) convincingly make
a case in favor of the Shapley value. They allege further virtues of that rule with respect
to others in Ginsburgh and Zang (2004). See also Be´al and Solal (2010) and Wang (2011).
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the first model we study, the axioms and rules we consider therein, as well
as our (axiomatic and game-theoretical) results for that model. In Section
3, we turn to the analysis of our second model. Section 4 concludes.
2 The first model
We consider a generalization of the museum pass problem introduced by
Ginsburgh and Zang (2003). As these authors, we assume that the actual
subset of museums visited by each holder of a (museum) pass is observed.
Besides, we also include in our model the entrance prices (without the pass)
to each museum, and the number of visits without the pass.
2.1 Preliminaries
The main mathematical conventions and notations, used here, are as follows.
The set of non-negative (positive) real numbers is R+ (R++). The set of
non-negative (positive) integer numbers is Z+ (Z++). Vector inequalities
are denoted by > and ≥. More precisely, x > y means that each coordinate
of x is greater than the corresponding coordinate of y, whereas x ≥ y allows
some of them to be equal. Finally, given a set S and a subset T , we denote
the projection of the vector x ∈ R|S|+ over T as xT , i.e., xT = (xi)i∈T .
Let M represent the set of all potential museums, which may be finite
or infinite. Let M be the family of all finite (non-empty) subsets of M.
An element M ∈ M describes a finite set of museums. Its cardinality is
denoted by m. Now, let N represent the set of all potential costumers,
i.e., individuals who might be interested in acquiring a museum pass (which
would grant access to all museums) and let N be the family of all finite (non-
empty) subsets of N. An element N ∈ N describes a finite set of customers.
Its cardinality is denoted by n.4
A (museum) problem is a 6-tuple (M,N, pi,K, p, v) where:
• M ∈M is the set of museums.
• N ∈ N is the set of customers acquiring a (museum) pass.
• pi ∈ R+ is the price of a pass.
4Note that this is similar although not identical to the general model described by
Casas-Me´ndez et al., (2014) to survey all the recent contributions in the related literature.
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• K ∈ 2nM is the profile of sets of museums visited by each customer
(thanks to the pass), i.e., K = (Kl)l∈N , and, for each l ∈ N , Kl ⊂M
denotes the set of museums visited by customer l (thanks to the pass).
We assume Kl 6= ∅, for each l ∈ N .
• p ∈ Rm++ is the profile of entrance prices.
• v ∈ Zm+ \ {0} is the profile of visits without the pass.
For ease of notation, we refer to the revenue generated from selling passes
by E, i.e., E = npi.
For each i ∈M , let Ui(K) denote the set of customers visiting museum
i with the pass. Namely, Ui(K) = {j ∈ N : i ∈ Kj}. As for cardinalities, we
consider the following notational conventions: νi = |Ui(K)|, for each i ∈M ,
and kl = |Kl|, for each l ∈ N .
The family of all the problems described as above is denoted by Ppv.5
We now formalize some focal subclasses of problems that will play a role
in our analysis.
Let P be the set of problems defined by the 4-tuple (M,N, pi,K), in
which each component is described as above. In other words, P corresponds
to situations where we neither take into account the entrance price of a
museum, nor the number of visits without pass. This is the class of problems
studied in Ginsburgh and Zang (2003, 2004), as well as in Be´al and Solal
(2009) and Wang (2011).
Let Pp be the set of problems defined by the 5-tuple (M,N, pi,K, p), in
which each component is described as above. In other words, Pp corresponds
to situations where we do not take into account the number of visits without
pass.
2.2 Rules
A rule (on Ppv) is a mapping that associates with each problem an al-
location indicating the amount each museum gets from the revenue gen-
erated by passes sold. Formally, R : Ppv → Rm+ is such that, for each
5One could consider a generalization of the model in which, instead of allowing for
only one kind of pass that allows its holders to visit all museums, a family of passes
({piK}K⊆M ), each allowing its holders to visit a specific group of museums (and possibly
pricing differently), is considered. As we will endorse an axiom of additivity on visitors, the
resolution of a general problem, so constructed, could be decomposed into the resolution of
the problems involving each of the passes within the family. Thus, the analysis presented
next, and the corresponding results, would extend to this generalized setting.
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(M,N, pi,K, p, v) ∈ Ppv,∑
i∈M
Ri (M,N, pi,K, p, v) = E.
The vector R (M,N, pi,K, p, v) represents a desirable way of dividing the
overall revenue from the sales of passes among the museums in M . Note that
the entire amount is allocated, which imposes a sort of efficiency condition.
We now give some examples of rules.
The Shapley rule (e.g., Ginsburgh and Zang, 2003) allocates the price
of each pass equally among the museums visited by the user of such pass.6
Namely, for each (M,N, pi,K, p, v) ∈ Ppv, and i ∈M ,
Si (M,N, pi,K, p, v) =
∑
l∈N,i∈Kl
pi
kl
.
Note that the above rule neither takes into account p nor v, and then
its definition would also be valid for P and Pp. Nevertheless, the previous
rule can also be generalized, so that p and v play a role in the allocation
process. For instance, the p-Shapley rule allocates the price of each pass
among the museums visited by the user of such pass, proportionally to the
entrance price of the museums. Namely, for each (M,N, pi,K, p, v) ∈ Ppv,
and i ∈M ,
Spi (M,N, pi,K, p, v) =
∑
l∈N,i∈Kl
pi∑
j∈Kl
pj
pi.
Note that the previous rule can also be defined on Pp, but not on P.
Finally, the pv-Shapley rule allocates the price of each pass among the
museums visited by the user of such pass, proportionally to the product of
the entrance price and the number of visits without the pass of the museums.
Namely, for each (M,N, pi,K, p, v) ∈ Ppv, and i ∈M ,
Spvi (M,N, pi,K, p, v) =
∑
l∈N,i∈Kl
pivi∑
j∈Kl
pjvj
pi.
Note that the last rule can neither be defined on P, nor on Pp.
6The reader is referred to Section 2.5 for a plausible reason to name this rule after
Shapley.
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2.3 Axioms
We now present some axioms in this model. For ease of exposition, we only
define the axioms for the domain Ppv. The counterpart definitions for the
domains Pp and P are straightforwardly obtained.
Equal treatment of equals says that if two museums have the same visitors
with the pass, the same number of visits without the pass, and the same
entrance price, then they should receive the same amount.
ETE. For each (M,N, pi,K, p, v) ∈ Ppv, and i, j ∈M such that (pi, vi, Ui(K)) =
(pj , vj , Uj(K)),
Ri (M,N, pi,K, p, v) = Rj (M,N, pi,K, p, v) .
Dummy says that if nobody visits a given museum with the pass, then
such museum gets no revenue.
DUM. For each (M,N, pi,K, p, v) ∈ Ppv, and i ∈M , such that Ui(K) =
∅,
Ri (M,N, pi,K, p, v) = 0.
Additivity on visitors says that, given two groups of customers acquiring
the museum pass, it is equivalent to consider them separately, or as the same
group.
ADV. For each (M,N, pi,K, p, v),
(
M,N1, pi,K1, p, v
)
,
(
M,N2, pi,K2, p, v
) ∈
Ppv, such that N = N1 ∪N2 and K = (K1,K2),
R (M,N, pi,K, p, v) = R
(
M,N1, pi,K1, p, v
)
+R
(
M,N2, pi,K2, p, v
)
.
The next axiom is proportionality to independent visits, which refers to
the effect that the number of visits without the pass should have on the
allocation process. In order to motivate it, consider two museums i and
j such that the only difference between them is that vi = 2vj . In such a
case, it seems natural that the revenue of museum i be twice the revenue of
museum j. More generally, the axiom says the following:
PIV. For each (M,N, pi,K, p, v) ∈ Ppv and i, j ∈M such that Ui(K) =
Uj(K), pi = pj and vi = λvj , for some λ ∈ Z++,
Ri (M,N, pi,K, p, v) = λRj (M,N, pi,K, p, v) .
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Notice that PIV is a stronger axiom than ETE.
The last axiom we consider is splitting-proofness. To motivate this axiom,
think of the situation in which a museum considers splitting into several
museums (for instance, each floor of the initial museum is considered as a
new independent museum), assuming that the customers that would had
visited the original museum (with or without the pass) would also visit each
new museum, and that the entrance price of the original museum is the
sum of the entrance prices of the new museums. The axiom requires that,
under these specific circumstances, the revenue obtained by each of the other
pre-existing museums does not change.7
SP. Let (M,N, pi,K, p, v) ∈ Ppv, i ∈M , and (M ′, N, pi,K ′, p′, v′) ∈ Ppv
be such that:
• M ′ = (M\ {i}) ∪ {i1, ..., ir} .
• For each l ∈ N, K ′l = Kl if i /∈ Kl and K ′l = (Kl\ {i}) ∪
{
i1, ..., ir
}
otherwise.
• For each j ∈M\ {i}, p′j = pj and p′i1 + p′i2 + · · ·+ p′ir = pi.
• For each j ∈M\ {i}, v′j = vj and v′i1 = v′i2 = · · · = v′ir = vi.
Then,
Rj (M,N, pi,K, p, v) = Rj
(
M ′, N, pi,K ′, p′, v′
)
, for each j ∈M\ {i} .
Notice that SP implies that
Ri (M,N, pi,K, p, v) =
r∑
s=1
Ris
(
M ′, N, pi,K ′, p′, v′
)
.
This fact will be used often in the proofs of some results.
7It is worth mentioning that the model we analyze here does not allow for strategic
considerations arising from price decisions, taking into account agents’ valuations of the
different floors. Those considerations might render this axiom questionable in such more
general setting.
7
2.4 Axiomatic results
We start this section by presenting a straightforward characterization of the
Shapley rule for the domain P, which partly motivates the remaining results
of the paper.
Proposition 1 A rule defined on P satisfies equal treatment of equals,
dummy and additivity if and only if it is the Shapley rule.
Proof. It is obvious that the Shapley rule satisfies the axioms. Let R be a
rule satisfying the three axioms in the statement, and let (M,N, pi,K) ∈ P
and l ∈ N . By DUM , Ri (M, {l} , pi,K) = 0 for each i /∈ Kl. By ETE,
Ri (M, {l} , pi,K) = Rj (M, {l} , pi,K) for each i, j ∈ Kl.As
∑
i∈M
Ri (M, {l} , pi,K) =
pi, we deduce that Ri (M, {l} , pi,K) = pikl for each i ∈ Kl. Consequently, it
follows, by ADV , that Ri (M,N, pi,K) =
∑
l∈N,i∈Kl
pi
kl
, for each i ∈ M , as
desired.
Remark 1 The axioms used in Proposition 1 are independent.
Let R1 be the rule in which, for each customer j, the amount he pays
goes to the museum with the lowest number he visited. Namely, for each
problem (M,N, pi,K) ∈ P, and each i ∈M,
R1i (M,N, pi,K) =
∑
j∈N :i= min
i′∈Kj
{i′}
pi.
R1 satisfies DUM and ADV , but fails to satisfy ETE.
Let R2 be the equal split rule. Namely, for each problem (M,N, pi,K) ∈
P, and i ∈M,
R2i (M,N, pi,K) =
E
m
.
R2 satisfies ETE and ADV , but fails to satisfy DUM.
Let R3 be the rule that divides the total amount among all museums
proportionally to their total number of visits (with the pass). Namely, for
each problem (M,N, pi,K) ∈ P, and i ∈M,
R3i (M,N, pi,K) =
νi∑
j∈M
νj
E,
where recall that νi = |Ui(K)|. R3 satisfies ETE and DUM , but fails to
satisfy ADV . 
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Proposition 1 crucially relies on its restricted domain assumption. For
instance, it is straightforward to see that the p-Shapley and pv-Shapley rules
also satisfy equal treatment of equals, dummy and additivity on their re-
spective domains. Actually, the next proposition shows that if we strengthen
equal treatment of equals to proportionality to independent visits, and add
splitting-proofness to the axioms used in Proposition 1, we single-out the
pv-Shapley rule at the general domain Ppv.
Proposition 2 A rule defined on Ppv satisfies proportionality to indepen-
dent visits, dummy, additivity, and splitting-proofness if and only if it is the
pv-Shapley rule.
Proof. It is straightforward to prove that the pv-Shapley rule satisfies the
axioms.
Let R be a rule, defined on Ppv, satisfying PIV , DUM , ADV , and SP .
Let (M,N, pi,K, p, v) ∈ Ppv and i ∈M. By ADV,
Ri (M,N, pi,K, p, v) =
∑
l∈N
Ri (M, {l} , pi,Kl, p, v) .
By DUM, Ri (M, {l} , pi,Kl, p, v) = 0, for each i /∈ Kl. Thus,
Ri (M,N, pi,K, p, v) =
∑
l∈N,i∈Kl
Ri (M, {l} , pi,Kl, p, v) .
Thus, it suffices to prove thatRi (M, {l} , pi,Kl, p, v) = Spvi (M, {l} , pi,Kl, p, v),
for each l ∈ N and i ∈ Kl.
Fix then l ∈ N and i ∈M such that i ∈ Kl. We assume that pi is not a
rational number, whereas, for each j ∈ Kl\ {i} , pj is a rational number.8
Let us denote P = (M, {l} , pi,Kl, p, v) . For each ε > 0, and each j ∈
Kl\ {i} , let qεj , q∗ε, qεi ∈ Z++ be such that 1q∗ε ≤ ε, pj =
qεj
q∗ε and
qεi
q∗ε < pi <
qi
ε+1
q∗ε .
For each T ⊂ Kl\ {i} = {h1, ..., hkl−1} let P T =
(
MT , {l} , pi,KTl , pT , vT
)
be the problem in which each museum j ∈ T splits into qεj museums
{
j1, ..., jq
ε
j
}
and, for each r = 1, ..., qεj , pjr =
1
q∗ε and vjr = vj . Besides, the museums in
M\T remain the same. Formally,
8Using an induction argument we can extend this proof to the general case in which a
number of museums (not necessarily one) have prices that are not rational numbers. The
case in which all prices are rational numbers is similarly obtained.
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• MT = (M\T ) ∪
(
∪j∈T
{
j1, ..., jq
ε
j
})
,
• KTl = ∪j∈T
(
(Kl\ {j}) ∪
{
j1, ..., jq
ε
j
})
,
• pT = (pTk )k∈MT ∈ R|M
T |
+ is such that p
T
jr = pjr =
1
q∗ε , for each j ∈ T ,
and each r = 1, ..., qεj , whereas p
T
k = pk, for each k ∈M \ T ,
• vT = (vTk )k∈MT ∈ Z|M
T |
+ is such that v
T
jr = vj , for each j ∈ T , and
each r = 1, ..., qεj , whereas v
T
k = vk, for each k ∈M \ T .
Let P ′ = (M ′, {l} , pi,K ′l , p′, v′) be the problem arising from P{h1,...,hkl−1}
after museum i splits into qεi + 1 museums
{
i1, ..., iq
ε
i+1
}
such that pir =
1
q∗ε
for each r = 1, ..., qεi , piq
ε
i
+1 = pi− q
ε
i
q∗ε , and vir = vi for each r = 1, ..., q
ε
i + 1.
Formally,
• M ′ =
(
M{h1,...,hkl−1} \ {i}
)
∪ {i1, ..., iqεi+1},
• K ′l =
(
K
{h1,...,hkl−1}
l \ {i}
)
∪ {i1, ..., iqεi+1},
• p′ = (p′k)k∈M ′ ∈ R|M
′|
+ is such that p
′
ir =
1
q∗ε , for each r = 1, ..., q
ε
i ,
p′
iq
ε
i
+1 = pi − q
ε
i
q∗ε , whereas p
′
k = pk, for each k ∈M{h1,...,hkl−1} \ {i},
• v′ = (v′k)k∈M ′ ∈ Z|M
′|
+ is such that v
′
ir = vi for each r = 1, ..., q
ε
i + 1
whereas v′k = vk, for each k ∈M{h1,...,hkl−1} \ {i}.
Consider the sequence of problems
P → P {h1} → P {h1,h2} → ...→ P{h1,...,hkl−1} → P ′.
Notice that each problem is obtained from the previous one after some
museum splits into several ones, as in the axiom of SP. Thus, we can apply
such axiom to each pair of consecutive problems. More precisely:
• By SP , applied to P and P {h1},
Rj (P ) = Rj
(
P {h1}
)
for each j ∈ Kl\ {h1} , and
Rh1 (P ) =
qεh1∑
r=1
Rhr1
(
P {h1}
)
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• By SP , applied to P {h1} and P {h1,h2},
Rj
(
P {h1}
)
= Rj
(
P {h1,h2}
)
for each j ∈ Kl\ {h1, h2} ,
Rhr1
(
P {h1}
)
= Rhr1
(
P {h1,h2}
)
for each r = 1, ..., qεh1 , and
Rh2
(
P {h1}
)
=
qεh2∑
r=1
Rhr2
(
P {h1,h2}
)
• Reiterating the previous argument, we end up obtaining, after apply-
ing SP to P{h1,...,hkl−1} and P ′,
Rhrα
(
P{h1,...,hkl−1}
)
= Rhrα
(
P ′
)
for each α = 1, ..., kl − 1 and r = 1, ..., qεhα , and
Ri
(
P{h1,...,hkl−1}
)
=
qεi+1∑
r=1
Rir
(
P ′
)
.
Thus,
Ri (P ) = Ri
(
P {h1}
)
= .... = Ri
(
P{h1,...,hkl−1}
)
=
qεi∑
r=1
Rir
(
P ′
)
+R
iq
ε
i
+1
(
P ′
)
.
As R satisfies PIV , which implies ETE, it follows that
Ri (P ) = q
ε
iRi1
(
P ′
)
+R
iq
ε
i
+1
(
P ′
)
. (1)
Let j ∈ Kl\ {i}. Then j = hg for some g = 1, ..., kl − 1. Now,
Rj (P ) = Rj
(
P {h1}
)
= ... = Rj
(
P {h1,...,hg−1}
)
=
qεhg∑
r=1
Rhrg
(
P {h1,...,hg}
)
=
qεhg∑
r=1
Rhrg
(
P {h1,...,hg+1}
)
= ... =
qεhg∑
r=1
Rhrg
(
P ′
)
.
As R satisfies PIV , which implies ETE, it follows that
Rj (P ) =
qεj∑
r=1
Rhrg
(
P ′
)
= qεjRj1
(
P ′
)
= qεj
vj
vi
Ri1
(
P ′
)
. (2)
11
Claim. R
iq
ε
i
+1 (P ′) ≤ Ri1 (P ′) .
In order to prove the claim, let Pα be the problem obtained from P ′
after splitting museum i1 in two museums: α1, with price pi − q
ε
i
q∗ε , and α
2
with price 1q∗ε −
(
pi − q
ε
i
q∗ε
)
. As R is non-negative and satisfies SP ,
Rα1 (P
α) ≤ Rα1 (Pα) +Rα2 (Pα) = Ri1
(
P ′
)
.
Furthermore, by SP ,
R
iq
ε
i
+1
(
P ′
)
= R
iq
ε
i
+1 (Pα) = Rα1 (P
α) .
Thus,
R
iq
ε
i
+1
(
P ′
) ≤ Ri1 (P ′) ,
as stated in the claim.
The claim implies that Ri (P ) is minimum when Riq
ε
i
+1 (P ′) = 0 and
maximum when R
iq
ε
i
+1 (P ′) = Ri1 (P ′) . We then compute it in both cases:
• Suppose R
iq
ε
i
+1 (P ′) = 0. Then, by (1) and (2),
pi = Ri (P ) +
∑
j∈Kl\{i}
Rj (P )
= qεiRi1
(
P ′
)
+
∑
j∈Kl\{i}
qεj
vj
vi
Ri1
(
P ′
)
= Ri1
(
P ′
)qεi + ∑
j∈Kl\{i}
qεj
vj
vi
 .
Now,
qεi +
∑
j∈Kl\{i}
qεj
vj
vi
=
qεi
q∗ε
q∗ε +
∑
j∈Kl\{i}
qεj
q∗ε
vj
vi
q∗ε
=
q∗ε
vi
 qεi
q∗ε
vi +
∑
j∈Kl\{i}
pjvj
 .
Thus,
Ri1
(
P ′
)
=
pivi(
qεi
q∗ε vi +
∑
j∈Kl\{i}
pjvj
)
q∗ε
,
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and, therefore,
Ri (M, {l} , pi,Kl, p, v) ≥
pivi
qεi
q∗ε
qεi
q∗ε vi +
∑
j∈Kl\{i}
pjvj
. (3)
Likewise, for each j ∈ Kl\ {i} ,
Rj (M, {l} , pi,Kl, p, v) = qεj
vj
vi
Ri1
(
P ′
)
=
pivj(
qεi
q∗ε vi +
∑
j∈Kl\{i}
pjvj
)
q∗ε
qεj
=
pipjvj
qεi
q∗ε vi +
∑
j∈Kl\{i}
pjvj
.
• Suppose R
iq
ε
i
+1 (P ′) = Ri1 (P ′) . Using arguments similar to those used
in the previous bullet item we can prove that
Ri (M, {l} , pi,Kl, p, v) ≤
pivi
qεi+1
q∗ε
qεi+1
q∗ε vi +
∑
j∈Kl\{i}
pjvj
, (4)
and, for each j ∈ Kl\ {i} ,
Rj (M, {l} , pi,Kl, p, v) = pipjvjqεi+1
q∗ε vi +
∑
j∈Kl\{i}
pjvj
.
As 1q∗ε ≤ ε, and ε > 0 is arbitrary, we deduce from (3) and (4) that, for
each i ∈ Kl,
Ri (M, {l} , pi,Kl, p, v) = pivi∑
j∈Kl
pjvj
= Spvi (M, {l} , pi,Kl, p, v) ,
as desired.
Remark 2 The axioms used in Proposition 2 are independent.
The p-Shapley rule Sp satisfies DUM, ADV and SP , but fails to satisfy
PIV.
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Let R4 be the rule that divides the total amount proportionally to the
product of the price and the number of independent visits. Namely, for each
problem (M,N, pi,K, p, v) ∈ Ppv and i ∈M,
R4i (M,N, pi,K, p, v) =
pivi∑
j∈M
pjvj
E.
R4 satisfies PIV, ADV, and SP , but fails to satisfy DUM.
Let R5 be the rule that divides the total amount among the museums pro-
portionally to the product of the price, the number of independent visits, and
the number of visits with pass. Namely, for each problem (M,N, pi,K, p, v) ∈
Ppv and i ∈M,
R5i (M,N, pi,K, p, v) =
piviνi∑
j∈M
pjvjνj
E.
R5 satisfies PIV, DUM, and SP , but fails to satisfy ADV.
Let R6 be such that for each problem (M,N, pi,K, p, v) ∈ Ppv and i ∈M,
R6i (M,N, pi,K, p, v) =
∑
j∈M,i∈Kj
p2i vi∑
i′∈Kj
p2i′vi′
pi.
R6 satisfies PIV, DUM, and ADV , but fails to satisfy SP. 
We conclude this section with a counterpart characterization of the p-
Shapley at the domain Pp.
Proposition 3 A rule defined on Pp satisfies dummy, additivity, and splitting-
proofness if and only if it is the p-Shapley rule.
Proof. It is straightforward to prove that Sp satisfies the axioms in the
statement. Conversely, let R be a rule defined on Pp satisfying DUM ,
ADV , and SP . Let (M,N, pi,K, p) ∈ Pp and i ∈M. By ADV,
Ri (M,N, pi,K, p) =
∑
l∈N
Ri (M, {l} , pi,Kl, p) .
By DUM, Ri (M, {l} , pi,Kl, p) = 0, for each i /∈ Kl. Thus,
Ri (M,N, pi,K, p) =
∑
l∈N,i∈Kl
Ri (M, {l} , pi,Kl, p) .
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Fix l ∈ N and consider the problem (M, {l} , pi,Kl, p). We show next
that R satisfies ETE at (Kl, {l} , pi,Kl, p).9 Suppose, by contradiction,
that there exist i, j ∈ Kl such that pi = pj , and Ri (Kl, {l} , pi,Kl, p) 6=
Rj (Kl, {l} , pi,Kl, p). Consider then the two new problems in which all the
remaining museums in Kl merge with i or j, respectively, to appear as a
single museum, whose price is the sum of the former individual prices, i.e.,
Pi ≡
{i, h}, {l} , pi, {i, h},
pi, ∑
k∈Kl\{i}
pk
 ,
and
Pj ≡
{j, h}, {l} , pi, {j, h},
pj , ∑
k∈Kl\{j}
pk
 .
Then, by SP ,
R(Pi) = (Ri (Kl, {l} , pi,Kl, p) , pi −Ri (Kl, {l} , pi,Kl, p)),
and
R(Pj) = (Rj (Kl, {l} , pi,Kl, p) , pi −Rj (Kl, {l} , pi,Kl, p)).
We now consider two new problems arising from Pi and Pj , respectively,
after splitting museums i and j in two new museums each with half price,
i.e.,
Pˆi ≡
{i, j, h}, {l} , pi, {i, j, h},
pi
2
,
pi
2
,
∑
k∈Kl\{i}
pk
 ,
and
Pˆj ≡
{i, j, h}, {l} , pi, {i, j, h},
pj
2
,
pj
2
,
∑
k∈Kl\{j}
pk
 .
Then, by SP ,
Ri (Kl, {l} , pi,Kl, p) = Ri(Pˆi) +Rj(Pˆi),
and
Rj (Kl, {l} , pi,Kl, p) = Ri(Pˆj) +Rj(Pˆj).
9The proof of this claim is inspired by a similar argument developed by de Frutos
(1999).
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Now, note that Pˆi ≡ Pˆj . Thus, the above implies that Ri (Kl, {l} , pi,Kl, p) =
Rj (Kl, {l} , pi,Kl, p), a contradiction.
As R satisfies ADV , it follows from the above claim that R also satisfies
ETE for each problem (M,N, pi,K, p) ∈ Pp.
The rest of the proof is almost analogous to the corresponding part of
the proof of Proposition 2 and, thus, we omit it.
Remark 3 The axioms used in Proposition 3 are independent.
Let R7 be the rule that divides the total amount proportionally to the
price. Namely, for each problem (M,N, pi,K, p) ∈ Pp and i ∈M,
R7i (M,N, pi,K, p) =
pi∑
j∈N
pj
E.
R7 satisfies ADV and SP , but fails to satisfy DUM.
Let R8 be the rule that divides the total amount proportionally to the
product of the price and the number of visits with pass. Namely, for each
problem (M,N, pi,K, p) ∈ Pp and i ∈M,
R8i (M,N, pi,K, p) =
piνi∑
j∈N
pjνj
E.
R8 satisfies DUM and SP , but fails to satisfy ADV.
Let R9 be such that, for each problem (M,N, pi,K, p) ∈ Pp and i ∈ N,
R9i (M,N, pi,K, p) =
∑
j∈M,i∈Kj
p2i∑
j∈Kj
p2j
pi.
R9 satisfies DUM and ADV , but fails to satisfy SP. 
2.5 Game-theoretical results
We revisit in this section the game-theoretical approach to the museum pass
problem, as initially considered by Ginsburgh and Zang (2003).
A cooperative game with transferable utility, TU game, is a pair (Γ, u)
where Γ denotes a set of agents and u : 2Γ → R satisfies that u (∅) = 0. For
each coalition S ⊂ Γ, the unanimity game of the coalition S, uS , is defined
by uS(T ) = 1 if T ⊇ S and uS(T ) = 0 otherwise. The Shapley value φ is the
linear function that, for each unanimity game uS , is defined by φi(uS) =
1
|S|
if i ∈ S, and 0 otherwise. A weighted Shapley value generalizes the Shapley
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value by allowing different ways to split one unit between the members of S
in uS . More precisely, a vector of positive weights λ = {λi}i∈Γ is prescribed
and in each uS players split proportionally to their weights.
10
Ginsburgh and Zang (2003) associate with each problem P = (M,N, pi,K) ∈
P a cooperative game with transferable utility (M,uP ) where, for each
S ⊂M, uP (S) denotes the amount paid by the customers that only visited
museums in S. Namely,
uP (S) =
∑
l∈N,Kl⊂S
pi.
Ginsburgh and Zang (2003) proved that the Shapley rule is the Shapley
value of the game (M,uP ) . The next proposition shows that the remaining
rules we have presented here are weighted Shapley values of (M,uP ) .
Proposition 4 The following statements hold:
1. For each problem P = (M,N, pi,K, p, v) ∈ Ppv, Spv(P ) coincides
with the weighted Shapley value of (M,uP ) where the weight system
is (pivi)i∈M .
2. For each problem P = (M,N, pi,K, p) ∈ Pp, Sp(P ) coincides with the
weighted Shapley value of (M,uP ) where the weight system is (pi)i∈M .
Proof. We only prove the first statement, as the second can be similarly
proved.
Let P = (M,N, pi,K, p, v) ∈ P. For each l ∈ N , we denote Pl =
(M, {l} , pi,Kl, p, v) . Then, for each S ⊂M ,
uPl (S) =
{
pi if Kl ⊂ S
0 otherwise,
and, therefore,
uP (S) =
∑
l∈N,Kl⊂S
pi =
∑
l∈N
uPl (S) .
Thus, by the additivity of weighted Shapley values (e.g., Kalai and
Samet, 1987), it follows that
Shw (M,uP ) =
∑
l∈N
Shw (M,uPl) ,
10See, e.g., Kalai and Samet (1987) for further details.
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for any weight system w.
Let w = (pivi)i∈M . Then, it is straightforward to see that
Shwi (M,uPl) =

pivi∑
j∈Kl
pjvj
pi if i ∈ Kl
0 otherwise.
Consequently, Shw (M,uP ) = S
pv (P ), as desired. 
It is also worth commenting on the stability properties (referring to the
participation constraints exemplified by the concept of the core of a coop-
erative game) conveyed by the above rules. More precisely, the core of a
game is defined as the set of feasible payoff vectors for the game, for which
no coalition can improve upon each vector. Formally, for each game (Γ, u),
its core, denoted by C (Γ, u), is defined by
C (Γ, u) =
{
x = (xi)i∈Γ such that
∑
i∈Γ
xi = u(Γ) and
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ u(S) for each S ⊂ Γ
}
.
It is not difficult to show that the three rules we have considered obey the
participation constraints set by the core. This is due to the fact that the
three rules guarantee that museums are only awarded part of the price of
a pass, provided the pass holder has visited such museum. In other words,
if a pass was not used to visit a given museum, such museum will not ob-
tain any revenue from such pass. In particular, such feature guarantees that
the amount paid (in passes) by the customers that only visited a group of
museums, is only shared among those museums, which could also obtain ad-
ditional revenue from other passes whose holders visited additional museums
(outside the group) too.
We have then proved the next proposition:
Proposition 5 The following statements hold:
1. For each P = (M,N, pi,K) ∈ P, S (P ) ⊂ C (M,uP ).
2. For each P = (M,N, pi,K, p) ∈ Pp, Sp (P ) ⊂ C (M,uP ).
3. For each P = (M,N, pi,K, p, v) ∈ Ppv, Spv (P ) ⊂ C (M,uP ).
It is also worth mentioning that the game (M,uP ) is convex (as men-
tioned by Ginsburgh and Zang, 2003).11 A well-known result in cooperative
11Formally, a game (Γ, u) is said to be convex if, for each S, T ⊂ Γ,
u(S) + u(T ) ≤ u(S ∪ T ) + u(S ∩ T ).
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game theory states that if the game is convex, then the core is the con-
vex combination of the vectors of marginal contributions. Kalai and Samet
(1987) prove that any weighted Shapley value is a convex combination of the
vectors of marginal contributions. Thus, an alternative proof for the above
proposition can also be obtained from these facts.
3 The second model
We now consider a second way of modeling the museum pass problem. The
difference with respect to the first model is that now we do not observe
the museums visited by each holder of a museum pass. We only know the
total number of pass holders that visited each museum. The resulting model
has been already considered by Casas-Me´ndez et al., (2011) and Este´vez-
Ferna´ndez et al., (2012).
3.1 Preliminaries
Let us assume that the notation and mathematical conventions set at the
beginning of Section 2 also hold here. A (museum) problem is now defined
by a 6-tuple (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) where:
• M ∈M is the set of museums.
• n ∈ Z+ is the number of (museum) passes sold.
• pi ∈ R+ is the price of a pass.
• ν ∈ Zm++ is the profile of pass visits (to each museum).
• p ∈ Rm++ is the profile of entrance prices.
• v ∈ Zm+ \ {0} is the profile of visits without the pass.
The revenue generated from selling passes is also denoted by E, i.e.,
E = npi. The family of all the problems described as above is now denoted by
P̂pv. Similarly, we also denote in this setting by P̂p the corresponding set of
problems after ignoring information about the number of visits without pass,
and by P̂ the corresponding set of problems after also ignoring information
about entrance prices.12
12As with the case of the first model, we could assume the existence of a family of passes
{1, . . . , %}, denoting, for each pass k ∈ {1, . . . , %}, the number of passes sold by nk, and
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3.2 Rules
A rule on P̂pv is a mapping that associates with each problem an allocation
indicating the amount each museum gets from the revenue generated by
passes sold. Formally, R : P̂pv → Rm+ is such that, for each (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) ∈
P̂pv ∑
i∈M
Ri (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) = E.
We now give some examples of rules.
The proportional rule allocates the revenue proportionally to the number
of pass visits. Namely, for each (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) ∈ P̂pv and i ∈M ,
Pi (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) =
νi∑
j∈M
νj
E.
Notice that, in this rule, neither prices nor independent visits play any
role and, therefore, the definition of the rule would also apply for P̂.
The p-proportional rule allocates the revenue proportionally to the amount
each museum would receive if all pass holders visiting the museum would had
paid the (full-fledged) entrance price. Namely, for each (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) ∈
P̂pv, and i ∈M ,
P pi (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) =
piνi∑
j∈M
pjνj
E.
Este´vez-Ferna´ndez et al., (2012) consider the p-proportional rule for the
domain P̂p.13
Finally, the pv-proportional rule allocates the revenue proportionally to
the amount each museum would receive if all pass holders visiting the mu-
seum would had paid its (full-fledged) entrance price, weighted by the num-
ber of visits without pass. Namely, for each (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) ∈ P̂pv, and
i ∈M ,
P pvi (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) =
piνivi∑
j∈M
pjνjvj
E.
the price of the pass by pik. Thus, n = (nk)
%
k=1 and pi = (pik)
%
k=1. If the kind of pass
acquired by each visitor is known, then our analysis (and results) could also be extended
to such general setting.
13They actually endorse a two-stage modification of it, in which first minimal rights,
i.e., the amount that is left, if positive, after granting each museum their claim (to be
interpreted as the full-fledged entrance price for each pass visit they had) are assigned to
each museum, and then the remaining revenue is allocated proportionally to the claims
adjusted down by those minimal rights.
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The pv-proportional rule has been considered in Casas-Me´ndez et al.,
(2011).14
The three proportional rules defined above are natural applications of the
general principle of proportionality to the three different classes of problems
we have considered.
3.3 Axioms
We now present some axioms in this model. As in the previous section,
and for ease of exposition, we only define the axioms for the domain P̂pv.
The counterpart definitions for the domains P̂p and P̂ are straightforwardly
obtained.
We first adapt the axioms of equal treatment of equals, dummy and
additivity on visitors to this new model.
Equal treatment of equals (ETE). For each (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) ∈ P̂pv, and
i, j ∈M such that (νi, pi, vi) = (νj , pj , vj),
Ri (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) = Rj (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) .
Dummy (DUM). For each (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) ∈ P̂pv, and i ∈M , such that
νi = 0,
Ri (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) = 0.
Additivity on visitors (ADV). For each (M,n, pi, ν, p, v),
(
M,n1, pi, ν1, p, v
)
,(
M,n2, pi, ν2, p, v
) ∈ P̂pv, such that n = n1 + n2 and ν = ν1 + ν2,
R (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) = R
(
M,n1, pi, ν1, p, v
)
+R
(
M,n2, pi, ν2, p, v
)
.
We now introduce two other related axioms. First, an alternative form
of additivity referring to the price of the museum pass. Formally,
Additivity on pass price (ADP). For each (M,n, pi, ν, p, v),
(
M,n, pi1, ν, p, v
)
,(
M,n, pi2, ν, p, v
) ∈ P̂pv, such that pi = pi1 + pi2,
R (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) = R
(
M,n, pi1, ν, p, v
)
+R
(
M,n, pi2, ν, p, v
)
.
We conclude this inventory of axioms with a new condition, called com-
patibility, which aims to describe the behavior of rules for scenarios in which
consensus among museums for the revenue allocation might be feasible. In
14They actually add the proviso that per capita rewards cannot exceed entrance prices.
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order to motivate it, let us consider first the domain P̂p, where νi and pi are
the only relevant characteristics of each museum i. As argued by Este´vez-
Ferna´ndez et al., (2012), in such domain, each museum i can claim at most
the amount it would had obtained if its services had been charged on the
basis of its regular price; namely νipi. Thus, if the amount collected from
the museum pass actually coincides with the aggregate claim of the mu-
seums (namely,
∑
i∈M
νipi = E) there seems to be consensus to state that
each museum should receive its claim. That would then be the statement of
compatibility for the domain P̂p. If instead of P̂p, we focus on P̂, where νi
is the only relevant characteristic of each museum i, it seems reasonable to
state that if the sum of the visits coincides with the total revenue (namely,∑
i∈M
νi = E) then each museum i should receive νi. That would then be
the statement of compatibility in P̂. Finally, as for P̂pv, where we have
three relevant characteristics for each museum (νi, pi, and vi), we proceed
as follows. Suppose that all museums share the first two of those individual
characteristics (namely, (νi, pi) = (νj , pj) for each i, j ∈ M). Suppose too
that the revenue obtained, via selling passes, equals the aggregate amount
museums would had obtained charging their (full-fledged) entrance price to
each pass visitor, weighted by the number of visits without the pass (namely,∑
i∈M
νipivi = E). It seems reasonable that, in the resulting scenario, each
museum i should obtain νipivi. That motivates the statement of compati-
bility in P̂pv, formally stated next.
Compatibility (COMP). For each (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) ∈ P̂pv such that∑
i∈M
piνivi = E,
Ri (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) = piνivi,
for each i ∈M .
3.4 Axiomatic results
Our first result says that the axioms of equal treatment of equals, dummy
and additivity on visitors are incompatible for the domain P̂, and hence for
domains P̂pv and P̂p. Notice that this result is in stark contrast with those
in the previous model, which showed that the three axioms were compatible
(actually characterizing the Shapley rule).
Proposition 6 There is no rule defined on P̂ satisfying equal treatment of
equals, dummy and additivity on visitors.
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Proof. Assume that there exists a rule R satisfying ETE, DUM and ADV .
Let M = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, ν1 = (1, 1, 0, 0, 0) , ν2 = (0, 0, 1, 1, 1) and pi ∈ R+.
Then, by ETE and DUM,
R (M, 2, pi, ν) =
(
2pi
5
,
2pi
5
,
2pi
5
,
2pi
5
,
2pi
5
)
,
R
(
M, 1, pi, ν1
)
=
(pi
2
,
pi
2
, 0, 0, 0
)
, and
R
(
M, 1, pi, ν2
)
=
(
0, 0,
pi
3
,
pi
3
,
pi
3
)
,
which contradicts ADV.
Propositions 1 and 6 illustrate the importance of setting the informa-
tional basis to analyze museum problems, as the same principles can lead
to different predictions in the models resulting from different informational
bases.
In the rest of the section, we show how to escape from the impossibility
stated in Proposition 6 replacing the notion of additivity. More precisely, the
following result provides a characterization of the three proportional rules
in the three different domains considered, using additivity on pass price and
compatibility.15
Proposition 7 The following statements hold:
1. A rule defined on P̂pv satisfies additivity on pass price and compati-
bility if and only if it is the pv-proportional rule.
2. A rule defined on P̂p satisfies additivity on pass price and compatibility
if and only if it is the p-proportional rule.
3. A rule defined on P̂ satisfies additivity on pass price and compatibility
if and only if it is the proportional rule.
Proof. We only prove part 1. Parts 2 and 3 are similar and, thus, we omit
their proofs.
It is straightforward to prove that the pv-proportional rule satisfies the
axioms in statement 1.
15At the risk of stressing the obvious, let us recall that the axioms used in each of the
statements of Proposition 7 are the corresponding ones for each domain. Thus, in spite of
sharing their names, they are all different axioms.
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Let R be a rule that satisfies ADP and COMP , (M,n, ν, p, v), and
i ∈M . By ADP , for each pi1, pi2 ∈ R+,
Ri (M,n, pi1, ν, p, v) +Ri (M,n, pi2, ν, p, v) = Ri (M,n, pi1 + pi2, ν, p, v) ,
which is precisely one of Cauchy’s canonical functional equations. By def-
inition of a rule we know that 0 ≤ Ri (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) ≤ npi. Thus, for
each interval [a, b] and each pi ∈ [a, b] we have that Ri (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) is
bounded. Now, it follows that the unique solutions to such equation are the
linear functions (e.g., Aczel, 2006; page 34). More precisely, there exists a
function gi :M× Z× Zm+ × Rm+ × Zm+ → R such that
Ri (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) = gi (M,n, ν, p, v)pi,
for each (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) ∈ P̂pv.
Let (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) ∈ P̂pv be such that ∑
j∈M
pjνjvj = npi. By COMP ,
Ri (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) = piνivi.
Thus,
gi (M,n, ν, p, v) =
piνivi
pi
=
piνivi∑
j∈M
pjνjvj
n
and, hence,
Ri (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) =
piνivi∑
j∈M
pjνjvj
npi = P pvi (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) ,
as desired.
Remark 4 The axioms used in Proposition 7 are independent.
The equal split rule satisfies ADP in each domain, but fails to satisfy
COMP .
Let R10 be such that, for each problem (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) ∈ P̂pv, and i ∈M,
R10i (M,n, pi, ν, p, v) =

piνivi if
∑
i∈M
piνivi = npi
npi
m
otherwise.
R10 satisfies COMP , but fails to satisfy ADP . It is straightforward to adapt
the definition of R10 to obtain the counterpart behavior for the remaining
domains. 
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4 Discussion
We have analyzed in this paper the problem of sharing the revenue from
bundled pricing taking an axiomatic perspective. We have presented two
different models for this problem depending on the informational basis of
the setting. Both of them enrich in specific ways previous contributions in
the literature. Nevertheless, we obtain qualitatively different results in both
models, which highlights the importance of setting one specific informational
basis to analyze the problem. In the first model we analyze, which is more in
line with the seminal contribution by Ginsburgh and Zang (2003), axiomatic
rationale is provided for several rules endorsing (in several, albeit related,
ways) the decomposition principle that underlies the so-called Shapley rule
proposed by Ginsburgh and Zang (2003) in their simpler setting. Even
though we also provide (axiomatic) rationale for somewhat counterpart rules
in the second model we analyze, we show how an incompatibility arises when
combining the exact counterpart axioms to some of those considered in the
first model.
It is also worth commenting that Ginsburgh and Zang (2004) also defend
the Shapley rule on specific strategic grounds. More precisely, they (rightly)
claim that such rule is immune to cross effects, by which they refer to the
possibility that additional (pass) sales and visits, corresponding to a cer-
tain group of museums, may also alter the outcome of the sharing assigned
to museums which are not in this group. It turns out that all the rules
we consider (and characterize) in the first model we analyze are immune
to cross effects, as they all award positive amounts only to those museums
being visited. On the other hand, the rules we consider (and characterize)
in the second model we present are indeed subject to those manipulations.
Somewhat related, Ginsburgh and Zang (2004) also mention that the Shap-
ley rule is immune to price manipulations, as museums would not benefit in
the sharing process from altering their entrance prices.16 This is a feature
shared with the so-called proportional rule considered in our second model,
but not with the remaining rules in whose definitions entrance prices play
an explicit role.
To conclude, we should acknowledge that our analysis in this paper does
not address some aspects that might be relevant in the problem of sharing
the revenue from bundled pricing. For instance, we do not deal with the
complex relationships that might exist between the independent price (and
16In our models, and those analyzed by Ginsburgh and Zang (2003, 2004), prices are,
nevertheless, exogenously given.
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independent visits) of each museum and the bundled price (and pass visits).
We believe that an appropriate way to do so would require a different (more
complex) model in which the value of a museum would be established by
comparing total revenues (independent and bundled) with and without pass,
while letting museums optimally choose their price. In such a model, some
of the principles and rules considered here might not be entirely desirable,
as they could accommodate different intuitions. For instance, there are
competing interpretations for which a museum might set a large price. On
the one hand, it might simply be that the museum is more valuable to
visitors, or that it makes a stronger commitment to the museum pass. On the
other hand, it might be that the museum is quite different to the others (i.e.,
agents’ valuations for museum visits are negatively correlated), or simply
that it aims to take advantage of the sharing rule. It seems natural to
reward a museum with a large price (in the revenue sharing process) in
the former cases, but not in the latter ones. This sort of considerations
are beyond the scope of the models analyzed in this paper (as well as the
existing literature on museum passes). The formalization (and analysis) of
a model allowing to address them is left for further research.
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